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FILLING THE "CHARTER GAP?":
HUMAN RIGHTS CODES IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR*
By GAVIN W. ANDERSON*
The author considers the capacity of the federal and
provincial human rights codes to deal with human
rights abuses in the private sector. He compares the
social democratic potential of the codes, with the
classical liberalism of Charter jurisprudence, which
shields the private sector from constitutional scrutiny.
Four case studies are used: the definition of "offered to
the public," mandatory retirement, the rights of the
poor, and systemic discrimination. It is concluded that
there are important similarities between the codes and
the Charter, both at an institutional design and a
doctrinal level. As a result, the codes have been unable
to redress significantly the problem of inequality in the
private sector.
L'auteur considre la capacit6 des codes de droits
humains f6d6raux et provinciaux de s'adresser aux abus
des droits humains dans le secteur priv6. II compare le
potentiel social-d6mocratique des codes avec le
lib~ralisme classique de la jurisprudence de la Charte,
qui prot~ge le secteur priv6 de l'examen
constitutionnel. Quatres 6tudes de cas sont pr~sentdes:
la d6finition de c(offert au public-, la retraite
obligatoire, les droits des pauvres, et la discrimination
syst6mique. L'auteur conclut qu'il existe d'importantes
ressemblances entre les codes et la Charte, au niveau de
la conception institutionnelle, ainsi qu'au niveau
textuel. En consequence, les codes n'ont pu redresser
de mani~re significantive le probl~me de l'indgalit6
dans le secteur priv6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The operation of human rights codes in the private sector has
been a source of intense judicial and academic activity in the Charte1
era. The question of whether human rights should apply in the private
sphere is not only an important interpretative issue, but is also linked to
a larger debate about the exercise of power and the allocation of
resources. The juridical resolution to this question has been increasingly
regarded as significant in framing the attitude of the state to imbalances
in social and economic power. There is a crucial choice to be made in
this context about the ends that human rights should serve, which can be
posed as the choice between the ideal types of classical liberalism and
social democracy. In broad terms, these differing visions of human
rights can be linked to laissez-faire free-market economics on the one
hand, and to interventionism in the pursuit of equality on the other. At
the constitutional level of the Charter, the debate has generally been
resolved in favour of classical liberalism. This paper considers whether it
is possible to advance a social democratic conception of human rights by
adopting a different (and non-constitutional) institutional design, and
proceeds by an analysis of the often neglected operation of the federal
and the various provincial human rights codes2 in the private sector.
Part II of this paper outlines the pre-eminence of classical
liberalism at the constitutional level, and then discusses why human
rights legislation might be expected to promote a more social democratic
conception of human rights. Part III analyzes the operation of human
rights legislation in the private sector, looking in particular at issues of
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
2 Human RightsAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 [hereinafter cHRA];Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990,
c. H.19 [hereinafter Ontario Code]; and Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12
[hereinafter Quebec Code]. The federal, Ontario, and Quebec codes will be the principal sources of
reference throughout although, where appropriate, examples from other codes will be used.
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mandatory retirement, the housing of the poor, and systemic
discrimination, and concludes that despite their ostensible advantages,
human rights legislation is unable to redress the balance in favour of the
socially and economically weak. Part IV considers why this is so, and
concludes that under closer scrutiny, there are more institutional and
doctrinal similarities than differences between human rights acts and the
Charter, and attempts to explain why the former seems incapable of
fulfilling its social democratic potential.
II. CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE
"CHARTER GAP" AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
LEGISLATIVE SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
The battleground between the classical liberal and social
democratic visions of human rights3 at the constitutional level has been
section 32 of the Charter, which limits its application to the federal and
provincial legislatures and governments. This section was first construed
in RWDSUv. Dolphin Deliver? as limiting the potential application of the
Charter to private action by removing the enforcement of court orders
based on the common law from the reach of the Constitution. In
McKinney v. University of Guelph5 the limited nature of constitutional
rights was further clarified when the Court held that an institutional link
with government was necessary to invoke the Charter, and so the action
against the defendant university was not able to proceed. More recently
in Young v. Young, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. has drawn a distinction between
"public" and "private" rights so that, even if a court order has its basis in
legislation, the Charter will not apply if the legislation deals with private
rights,6 as in the case of the Divorce Act.7 Although these judgments
3 An extended discussion of the concepts underlying these ideal types is set out in J.C. Bakan
et aL, "Developments in Constitutional Law: the 1993-94 Term" (1995) 6 Supreme Court L.R. (2d)
67. Their application at the Charter level is discussed in G.W. Anderson, "The Limits of
Constitutional Law: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Public/Private Divide"
in C. Gearty & A. Tomkins, eds., Understanding Human Rights (Herndon, Va: Books International,
1996) 529.
4 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 [hereinafter Dolphin Delivery].
5 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [hereinafter MclKnney].
6 [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 at 100.
7 R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2d Supp.).
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have been attacked as internally contradictory,8 they make sense when
measured against a classical liberal conception of rights which relies on a
negative conception of freedom, and have at their core the protection of
atomized individuals from state interference, especially if their rights to
private property are under threat. Central to this approach is the idea
that governmental power .is the greatest potential threat to rights and
freedoms, and this has resulted in the Court's erection of a public/private
divide, thus removing some areas of private life from political
interference.
The ascendancy of classical liberalism means that, at least at the
constitutional level, the alternative social democratic vision of human
rights is firmly rejected. The social democratic approach rests on a
different conception of the goals of the state, one in which positive
intervention in the name of achieving greater equality may in fact be
more conducive to the best protection of freedom: human rights should
serve redistributive ends, and the courts should accept that there is equal
potential for abuse of human rights by private bodies. It has been
suggested that there are two principal strategies available to try to
effectuate social democratic constitutionalism: either expand the class of
bodies against whom rights are available; or expand the class of rights
contained in the Constitution to include positive social and economic
rights, such as the right to housing, education, and health care.9 The
Supreme Court of Canada has emphatically renounced the former
course, and the latter came to grief in the Charlottetown Accord
referendum1 ° It would appear that, at present, it is the classical liberal
vision of human rights that predominates in constitutional practice. This
is reflected in the fact that the classical liberal goal of increasing the area
of economic freedom is preferred to the social democratic aim of
promoting the capacity for the constitutional protection of equality.
In spite of the prevailing constitutional orthodoxy, there remains
a genuine concern that the social democratic conception of human rights
should not be abandoned entirely. Not surprisingly, this view is
expressed most strongly by critics of the Court's Charter jurisprudence;
8 See, for example, A.C. Hutchinson & A. Petter, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal
Lie of the Charter" (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 278.
9 See M.V. Tushnet, "Living with a Bill of Rights" in Gearty & Tomkins, supra note 3 at 1.
10 The Accord existed as two separate documents: Consensus Report on the Constitution:
Charlottetown, 28 August 1992, Final Text (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1992); and Draft
Legal Text (Ottawa: 9 October 1992). It was defeated in a national referendum held 26 October
1992. For a discussion of the capacity of social rights to translate social democratic values into
practice, see LC. Bakan & D. Schneiderman, eds., Social Justice and the Constitution: Perspectives on
a Social Union for Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992).
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Allan Hutchinson, for example, emphasizes that the effect of the
Supreme Court's decisions is to exclude from Charter scrutiny "the major
source of inequality in our society: the maldistribution of economic
wealth and political power."11 However, these sentiments about the
dangers to human rights from private concentrations of power are also
echoed by the Court and its supporters. In Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v.
Canada (Director of Investigation and Research),12 La Forest J.-who
subsequently wrote the leading judgment in McKinney-expressed
concern that threats to civil liberties could still come from private
institutions beyond the reach of democratic politics. 13 In a similar vein,
Peter Hogg, who considers that the Court's section 32 jurisprudence is
"not only technically correct ... but is also sound as a matter of
constitutional policy," 14 agrees that in the context of equality rights, the
real danger is not legislation or governmental action. Instead, the threat
comes from "discrimination by private persons, such as employers, trade
unions, landlords, realtors, restaurateurs and other suppliers of goods
and services," and that in these situations "economic liberties of freedom
of property and contract, which imply a power to deal with whomever
one pleases, come into direct conflict with egalitarian values."
15
The question is therefore whether, given the constitutional
predilection for classical liberalism, there are any means available to give
concrete effect to a social democratic notion of human rights. The
Court and its supporters have suggested that a solution is possible, and
this takes the form of the various federal and provincial human rights
codes. The solution rests on a distinction between the constitutional and
legislative protection of rights: while classical liberal constitutionalism
11 A.C. Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1995) at 148.
12 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425.
13 bid. at 534-35:
The courts in Canada ... cannot remain oblivious to the concrete social, political and
economic realities within which our system of constitutional rights and guarantees must
operate. In particular, we must recognize that the Charter alone cannot secure that full
portion of individual freedoms to which we aspire. Effective regulation of the many
private and democratically unaccountable institutions which are capable of exercising
virtually coercive powers within their sphere of operations is also crucially important. We
cannot allow our commitment to the former to preclude our further reliance on the
latter.
14 P.W. Hogg, "The Dolphin Delivery Case: The Application of the Charter to Private
Action" (1987) 51 Sask. L. Rev. 273 at 279.
15 P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 1149
[hereinafter Constitutional Law].
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will not countenance regulation of economic freedom at the (higher)
level of constitutional law, such regulation is perfectly permissible at the
level of ordinary legislation. Moreover, the existence of human rights
acts and their operation in the private sector are important factors that
help justify section 32 Charter jurisprudence. Thus, Hogg notes that in
all Canadian jurisdictions, economic liberties have been subordinated to
egalitarian values by the enactment of human rights codes, 16 and that
this "fills a gap in the Charter."1 7 The purpose of this paper is to test the
validity of the claim that, by operating in the private sector, human rights
legislation "fills the Charter gap" by advancing a social democratic
conception of human rights. A serious commitment to social democratic
values would entail not merely overcoming the jurisdictional issue of
whether human rights legislation is applicable to private bodies, but also
of using this legislation to redress the acknowledged imbalances in social
and economic power outlined above. Before turning to the operation of
human rights legislation in practice, however, it is important to consider
why this particular institutional choice might be better placed to deliver
a social democratic approach to human rights adjudication.
A. Comparison of the Text, History, and Structure of the Charter with
Human Rights Legislation
Although the Charter experience might show how human rights
can be used to promote classical liberal values at the expense of equality,
this need not lead to the conclusion that there is no potential for using
human rights to further egalitarian values. Prima facie, the federal and
provincial human rights acts encourage the possibility of furthering
social democratic ends because they appear to address directly many of
the deficiencies perceived in the Charter they operate at the ordinary
political and legislative (not the constitutional) level; their primary
means of enforcement is the (executive) mechanism of commissions, and
not the (judicial) mechanism of the courts; and their anti-discrimination
focus embodies a more egalitarian conception of human rights. While
these presumptions should not necessarily be accepted at face value, a
more detailed comparison of the text, history, and structure of human
rights legislation suggests that they possess many potential advantages
over the Charter.
161bid. at 1149.
17 1bid. at 771.
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The critique of the Charter's failure to deal with abuses of private
power falls under three headings: first, that the Charter is a liberal
document designed to protect rather than disturb private power; second,
that this is partly achieved by elevating the issue to the abstract level of
constitutional law, which mystifies issues of social inequality; and third,
that conceiving of the issue in legal terms before a judicial forum
preserves the status quo of social power. Turning to the first charge,
there would probably be considerable agreement that, from reading the
text and history of section 32, it was never intended that the Charter
should apply to private actors.18 When one considers human rights
legislation, examination of the history and text points in the opposite
direction. The main political motivation of the supporters of the initial
anti-discrimination legislation was the inability of the common law (and
the Civil Code of Quebec) to deal with the more visible inequalities of
social power, on anything other than a formal basis 9 The movement
which sought the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation in the
1940s rejected ideas of social laissez-faire, and was instead committed to
protecting "a social right against discrimination in the private domain,
including employment, housing and the provision of goods and
services." 20 This movement led to the enactment of the first anti-
discrimination law in the Ontario Racial Discrimination Act of 1944,21
followed shortly thereafter by the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights.22 This
ideological commitment to the broader operation of human rights
legislation is reflected in the textual absence of any equivalent to section
32 in the cumulative codes and acts which consolidated the earlier
specific statutes.23
18 See R. Elliot & R. Grant, "The Charter's Application to Private Litigation" (1989) 23
U.B.C. L. Rev. 459 at 466.
19 See, for example, Christie v. York Corp., [1940] S.C.R. 139 at 142, where a tavern owner's
refusal to serve a black man was upheld on the grounds that the "general principle of the law of
Quebec [was] that of complete freedom of commerce." For a more detailed discussion of the
relevant case law, see W.S. Tarnopolsky, "Discrimination in Canada: Our History and our Legacy"
in W.$. Tarnopolsky, . Whitman & M. Ouelette, eds.,Discrimination in the Law and Administration
of Justice (Montreal: Thb6mis, 1993) 1.
20 R.B. Howe, "The Evolution of Human Rights Policy in Ontario" (1991) 24 Can. J. Pol. Sci.
783 at 787-78.
21 S.O. 1944, c. 51.
2 2 S.S. 1947, c. 35, as rep. by the Human Rights Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1.
23 Any application sections that do exist are for the purpose of making it clear that the Crown
is bound by the acts as well as the private sector (Ontario Codesupra note 2, s. 47; and CHRA, supra
note 2, s. 66). The Quebec Code, supra note 2, s. 55, perhaps because it contains fundamental
freedoms in addition to anti-discrimination provisions, is slightly reminiscent of section 32 of the
1995]
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It is also useful to note the reaction of the right and the business
community to these developments. Since the initial anti-discrimination
statutes in the 1940s and 1950s, the trend has been toward codification
and the creation of specific administrative agencies to enforce the
operation of the Acts. The prohibited grounds for discrimination now
include the receipt of public assistance 24 and social condition,25 which
(as will be seen in Part III, below) cannot be meaningfully interpreted
without imposing some positive obligations on government to alleviate
inequality. These trends have provoked considerable opposition from
the private interests threatened with increasing regulation. For example,
in Ontario, 1981 legislative reforms-which inter alia expanded the
grounds of discrimination and incorporated the idea of systemic
discrimination into the Code-were met with considerable opposition
from the Ontario Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian
Manufacturer's Association. This opposition was mainly because of the
proposals' potential incompatibility with more traditional liberal
individual negative rights2 6 Academic reaction has also been generally
more hostile to some of the recent developments? 7 Ian Hunter attacked
the 1981 reforms in Ontario as subordinating freedom of contract,
freedom of property, and the freedom to choose one's tenants, to the
goal of achieving equality of result which, in Hunter's view, makes too
great an incursion into human liberty.28 Although perhaps of no final
probative worth, the relative absence of a similar line of critique from
the right with respect to the Charter29 tends to reinforce the idea that
human rights legislation is potentially a much more serious threat to the
unimpeded exercise of private power when this power endangers basic
notions of equality.
The second charge against the Charter is one of mystification,
that is, it portrays intensely political issues in abstract legal terms and
Charter. Section 55 states: "The Charter affects those matters that come under the legislative
authority of Quebec." However, it is contextually clear that this is an inclusory and not an
exclusionary clause; see, for example, Quebec Code, s. 134, which refers to the commission of
offences by corporations.
24 Ontario Code, supra note 2, s. 2 (with respect to accommodation).
25 Quebec Code, supra note 2, s. 10.
2 6 Howe, supra note 20 at 797-98.
27 I. Hunter, "Human Rights Legislation in Canada: Its Origin, Development and
Interpretation" (1976) 15 West. Ont. L. Rev. 21 at 29; see also R. Knopff, Human Rights and Social
Technology: The New War on Discrimination (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989).
2 8 L Hunter, "Liberty and Equality: A Tale of Two Codes" (1983) 29 McGill L.J. 1 at 5.
2 9 R. Knopff & F.L. Morton, Charter Politics (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1992) is perhaps
the academic exception that proves the rule.
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cloaks its decisions in the legitimacy of constitutional authority20 Thus,
by treating the public/private issue as a matter to be decided by the
correct interpretation of section 32, the Charter is unable to deal with the
inequalities in social power that underlie this distinction. 31 Human
rights codes are not quite as susceptible to these objections. First, they
operate at a much greater level of specificity, which is seen to be one of
the advantages of keeping the Charter out of the private sphere:
Legislation [such as particular human rights law] can be tailored to deal with the tension
between privacy rights and equality or that between freedom of expression and hate
literature. It can expressly limit the applicability of equality guarantees to services or to
areas open to the public, or specify the right to set bona fide job qualifications. The
Charter is not so refined and provides no guidelines for its application.
-2
The increasingly detailed grounds of discrimination and
situations in which they apply are evident from reading the relevant
legislation. It is also difficult to say that human rights -codes disguise the
operation of political concerns. First, the genesis of the codes was itself
the result of political struggle for legislative action,33 and second, their
very political nature has been reflected in the ongoing contest over the
scope and content of the acts. Thus, in Ontario, there has been
continuous debate and reassessment since the first anti-discrimination
statue in 1944, leading sometimes to gains for human rights activists,
such as the expansive 1981 reforms, but also to some setbacks, most
recently in the form of Premier Mike Harris's announcement of the
abolition of employment equity and the intended scaling back of pay
equity.34
30 See Hutchinson, supra note 11, c. 4; M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of
Politics in Canada, rev. ed. (Toronto: Thompson Educational, 1994) at 60-68; and J.C. Bakan,
"Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and Legitimacy in Constitutional Thought" (1989) 27
Osgoode Hall LJ. 123.
31 See Hutchinson, supra note 11, c. 5.
32 K. Swinton, "Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" in G.A.
Beaudoin & W.S. Tarnopolsky, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Commentary
(Toronto: Carswell, 1982) 44 at 47.
33 See Howe, supra note 20 at 787-90.
34 That human rights legislation is regarded as the subject of ordinary politics was perhaps
most graphically demonstrated in the 1984 replacement of the British Columbia Human Rights
Code, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 186: see Human RightsAct, 1984, S.B.C. 1984, c. 22 [hereinafter Human
RightsAct]. For further information, see W.W. Black, B.C. Human Rights Review: Report on Human
Rights in British Columbia (Vancouver: Communications Branch, Ministry Responsible for
Multiculturalism and Human Rights, 1994) [hereinafter Black Report]. Black notes, at 21, that:
The current Human Rights Act came into effect in 1984. It replaced the 1973 Human
Rights Code. The Human Rights Commission that had been responsible for
administering the Code was dismantled and the staff dismissed. A new enforcement
1995]
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The third charge against the Charter is that judges, given their
background, training, and institutional position, are always more likely
to find in favour of the interests of economic liberty.35 Again one finds
human rights legislation in an apparently advantageous position.
Swinton argues that the issue of institutional choice is another factor
that rightly limits the Charter's application, as the administrative
structure of most human rights commissions is designed to encourage
conciliation, which in itself can have an educative effect on the parties
involved. 36 Thus, there may be a more flexible and less adversarial
process involved in a human rights complaint. There are other ways in
which the influence of legalism is mitigated: the lack of legal
qualifications to serve as a commissioner means that the people at the
administrative head of the enforcement systems come from a more
diverse background than most lawyers, and so their attitudes and actions
are less likely to be framed by the institutional legal morality of freedom
of contract, the right to private property, privacy, and so on. Even when
lawyers become more involved at the level of sitting on boards or
tribunals of inquiry, statistical evidence suggests the type of people
selected (including human-rights law professors) are more than likely to
find in favour of a complainant.37 In Quebec, the creation of a specialist
tribunal whose members are required to demonstrate "notable
experience and expertise in, sensitivity to and interest for matters of
human rights" is a further move away from narrow legalism.38 However,
while human rights legislation possesses a number of ostensible
improvements on the Charter, it is important to discover how this
translates into practice. This analysis will provide the focus of the
remainder of the paper.
system was not put in place for several months. These events provoked a strong negative
public reaction.
3 5 Mandel, supra note 30 at 46-60; and Bakan, supra note 30 at 173-76.
3 6 Swinton, supra note 32 at 48.
37 See T. Flanagan, R. Knopff & K Archer, "Selection Bias in Human Rights Tribunals"
(1988) 31 Can. Pub. Admin. 483.
38 Quebec Code, supra note 2, s. 101. It seems that the new tribunal is more likely to find in
favour of complainants: see Commission des Droits de la Personne du Quebec, Le traitement des
plaintes a la Commission des droits de lapersonne 1994 (Montreal: La Commission des Droits de la
Personne du Qu6bec, 1995).
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III. HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The next section considers whether the human rights codes in
fact "fill the Charter gap" by considering their operation vis-it-vis the
private sector in the concrete setting of four case studies. The first
two-the meaning of the term "service available to the public," and the
issue of mandatory retirement-afford a direct comparison of the
treatment of similar issues in both regimes. The final two-the rights of
the poor to adequate housing, and the problem of systemic
discrimination-confront head-on the ability of human rights codes to
improve the lot of the economically and socially disadvantaged. It will
become clear that human rights codes fail to live up to their social
democratic potential in several important respects.
A. The Applicability of Human Rights Legislation: Defining "The Public"
The experience of the Charter tells us that overcoming the
threshold jurisdictional issue of applicability is a necessary condition to
promoting social democratic aims in the private sector.39 There is no
textual equivalent to section 32 in human rights legislation, but this
simply means that threshold issues manifest themselves in different ways.
The importance of the terms "public" and "private" in limiting the
potential application of the human rights codes was considered by the
Supreme Court in University of British Columbia v. Berg.40 The case
involved a complaint by Janice Berg, a graduate student, who alleged
that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of mental
disability when she was refused a key to use the research and computer
facilities, and also a rating sheet needed to apply for a hospital
internship. The key in question was regularly issued to graduate
students in Ms Berg's situation and, as her previous history of mental
illness was known to the university, she complained that she had been
discriminated against in terms of section 3 of the British Columbia
Human Rights Act.41 Section 3 provided that "no person shall deny to
[or discriminate against] a person ... with respect to any service or facility
39 It is not, however, necessarily a sufficient condition. Obiter dicta in both Dolphin Delivery,
supra note 4; and MctInney, supra note 5, consider what the result would have been had the Charter
applied to the respondent body in question. In each case, the Court would still have found against
the appellants.
40 [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353 [hereinafter Berg].
41 Supra note 34.
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customarily available to the public, because of the ... mental disability of
that person." The member-designate of the B.C. Human Rights Council
found in Ms Berg's favour. However, in judicial review both the B.C.
Supreme Court and Court of Appeal held that the member-designate
had no jurisdiction to make that determination because, in terms of
section 3, the provision of the key and rating sheet were not services
customarily available to the public. The case was appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada.
The Court's decision focused on the meaning of "public." The
argument that won in the lower courts was that there was a distinction
between having the right to be admitted to a service, such as admission
to a university, and the rights that one enjoyed once the threshold of
admission was overcome, such as the right to receive a key to selected
areas within a university. The Supreme Court of Canada had earlier
approved of this distinction in Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. The
Vancouver Sun,42 where it was held that the availability to the public of
advertising space in a newspaper (the threshold issue) was subject to the
right of the newspaper to have editorial control over the content of that
advertising, even if that control was administered in a discriminatory
manner.43 InBerg, the Supreme Court rejected the logic in GayAlliance,
which required admitting students to university on a non-discriminatory
basis, but appeared to sanction discriminating against them once
admitted.44 Lamer C.J.'s approach to the definition of "public" was to
repudiate what he called a "quantitative analysis" as it would be difficult
"to see how anything less than all citizens can be said to be 'the public' of
a given municipality, province, or country."' 45 Accordingly, for Lamer
C.J., it was important to realize that any service would only be available
to a subset of the public, but that once that subset is identified in terms
of the threshold availability of a service, it remains "the public" with
respect to all aspects of the performance of that service. To determine
whether the Human Rights Act 46 applied, a principled approach was
required that considered the relationship between the service provider
42 [1979] 2 S.C.R. 435 [hereinafter Gay Alliance].
43 For a discussion of the implications of upholding the reasoning in GayAlliance, ibid., see
M.C. Crane, "Human Rights in the University: A Case Comment on Berg v. University of British
Columbia" (1992) 26 U.B.C. L Rev. 293.
44 See Berg, supra note 40 at 377-78, where Lamer C.J.'s observation that the designation of
universities as "private" for the purposes of the Charter (and the absence of a tort of discrimination)
may have influenced his decision.
45 Ibid. at 382.
46 Supra note 34.
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and the service user under the particular service.47 In the present case,
applying this relational approach resulted in holding that the key and
rating sheet were part of the public relationship between the university
and its students, and the appeal was upheld.
The existence of a similar qualification of prohibited
discrimination in every code with the exception of Ontario's meant that
the Court had avoided replicating the Dolphin Delivery48 problem under
human rights legislation. The decision was generally welcomed in
academic circles,49 and certainly if the human rights legislation is to be
serious in its attempts to deal with discrimination, the reasoning in Berg
is preferable to the narrow legalism of Gay Alliance. That is not to say
that Berg is not without its difficulties; as has been observed, Lamer C.J.
provides little guidance as to how his relational rather than quantitative
approach would make the initial differentiation between public and
private in a more complex instance than the university/student setting,
50
and the relational approach itself "reintroduces ... an internal
public/private dichotomy." 51 The last point is well put, and is in many
ways confirmed by Lamer C.J.'s discussion of the purpose of the Human
Rights Act with reference to the wording of section 3:
Thus, the legislature demonstrated an intention to restrict the application of the Act to
what may be described, subject to considerable refinement below, as accommodations,
services or facilities provided in the 'public' sphere ... the basic motivation behind such
limiting words is clear: the legislature did not wish human rights legislation to regulate all
of the private activities of its citizens.52
47 Berg, supra note 40 at 384; see also D. Greschner, "Why Chambers is Wrong: A Purposive
Interpretation of 'Offered to the Public" (1988) 52 Sask. L. Rev. 161, where a similar approach was
advanced to support the argument that all governmental services should be covered by the phrase
"services offered to the public." Although Greschner's comments are not specifically directed to
services offered by non-governmental actors, at 185, she warns against using the relational approach
to erect a form of public/private divide, stating that any "allegation by a non-governmental provider
of services that a relationship is private ought to be greeted with suspicion."
48 Supra note 4.
49 See M.C. Crane, "The University and its Students-A 'Very Public Relationship:' A
Comment on the Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in University of British Columbia v.
Berg" (1993) 27 U.B.C. L. Rev. 339; and D.F. Bur & J.K. Kehoe, "Developments in Constitutional
Law: the 1992-93 Term" (1994) 5 Supreme Court L.R. (2d) 29 at 61 and 63.
50 In Berg, supra note 40 at 387, Lamer CJ. observed that "if a university is not as 'public' an
institution as the government, it surely is very close to the 'public' end of the spectrum." Compare
McKinney, supra note 5.
51 Crane, supra note 49 at 353.
52 Berg, supra note 40 at 362.
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As one examines Berg more closely, one finds that, despite the
much broader disposal of the threshold issue, there are many similarities
with Charter jurisprudence in the framework of analysis adopted by the
Supreme Court. Threshold questions in both systems are informed by
the idea that it is possible to separate a reified public from a reified
private sector,53 and that this can be done by the proper application of
forensic exegesis: hence the preference for a principled approach to the
task. This attachment to the possibility of a public/private divide results
in the Court's analysis, no less than in the Charter context, being riddled
with a number of arbitrary distinctions. Thus, while Dolphin Delivery
rests on an artificial distinction between compulsive and permissive
statutes, which minimizes the complicity of the state,5 4 one finds a
similar sense of unreality in much of Berg. Thus, how small does a subset
of the public need to be before it becomes private? How does a
principled approach enable one to make this form of distinction?55
When does a relationship in a service situation, which might be "public"
under the principled approach, become "private" under the relational
approach (and does this not reintroduce the threshold/use distinction
that Lamer C.J. sought to eschew earlier in the judgment)?5 6 The point
is not that these questions are without answer, or that the distinctions
5 3 Ibid. at 363 (this is despite Lamer CJ.'s admission that the terms "public" and "private"
have no self-evident meaning).
54 See Hutchinson, supra note 11 at 123ff.
55 Compare the difference of opinion among supporters of a formal public/private divide in
the Charter context as to whether a principled or functional test is more appropriate: see
Constitutional Law, supra note 15 at 841; and J.D. Whyte, "Is the Private Sector Affected by the
Charter?" in L. Smith ed., Righting the Balance: Canada's New Equality Rights (Saskatoon: Canadian
Human Rights Reporter, 1986) 145 at 153.
56 The fact that several questions are left open about the application of the relational
approach in practice is demonstrated in the recent decision of Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers,[1996] 1 S.C.R. 571 at 607 [hereinafter Gould], La Forest J., where the Court grappled with the
major issue left open by the Berg decision, supra note 40, viz. how "public relationship" is to be
defined. The case centred on whether the appellant, who had been denied membership in the
defendant Order on the grounds that she was female, could rely on s. 8(a) of the Yukon Human
Rights Act, R.S.Y. 1986, (Supp.), c. 11, which states that "[n]o person shall discriminate when
offering or providing services, goods, or facilities to the public." The Court divided along gender
lines, holding by 7-2 that s. 8(a) did not apply to this situation: La Forest J., at 612-13, drew a
distinction between membership of the Order and its activity of collecting historical data, neither of
which was a service offered to the public, and the providing of such data to the public, which was.
L'Heureux-Dub6 J., at 646, and McLachlin J., at 656, position themselves differently in terms of
applying the relational approach, finding that membership and the collection of data were services
offered to the public, and so came under the umbrella of s. 8. Although the Court may have
clarified some of the doctrinal issues outstanding from Berg, the case reinforces the argument that
the distinctions being drawn remain artificial within their own terms, without some external point of
reference.
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cannot be made, but rather that the answer requires some external point
of justification. Lamer C.J. comes (perhaps surprisingly) close to stating
what this would be in the passage quoted above57 and this is where the
similarity between both systems is striking: the basis of the threshold
analysis in each case is that there is an area of activity which human
rights legislation ought not to regulate.58 In other words, Charter and
human rights jurisprudence share a commitment to the principle that
different sets of values should be applied to different social situations.
That this can result in a different disposition of the threshold issue in
human rights cases should not disguise the similarity, and one should be
alert to the possibility of a public/private divide insulating private power
arising in a more substantive manner. It is to this question that we now
turn our attention.
B. Mandatory Retirement
This issue affords a useful comparison of the operation of human
rights in the private sector in both Charter and human rights regimes.
Cases of alleged discrimination on grounds of age have been litigated in
this context in each system, and it is also a comparison explicitly drawn
by the Supreme Court. The Court's position vis-it-vis the Charter was
made clear in McKinney.59 At issue was whether the plaintiff professors
could rely on the Charter's section 15 equality provisions to challenge the
mandatory retirement policy of the defendant university. The Court
disposed of the question by invoking the threshold issue of application:
the University of Guelph's considerable autonomy, in the Court's
opinion, meant that there was no institutional link with government
sufficient to invoke the Charter. However, while there was no relief in
the present instance, the Court made it known that it was not unaware of
the danger to equality from of the unchecked operation of private
power. In the following passage from his judgment in McKinney, La
57Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
5 8 This is confirmed to some extent by obiter comments of La Forest J. in Gould, supra note 56
at 607-11, where he surveys the relevant American jurisprudence. Although he notes that the
American approach focuses on the nature of the organization, he considers, at 611, that factors
considered by American courts "in determining which organizations are sufficiently private to
warrant constitutional protection of their intimate association" are relevant to the Canadian
relational approach. This is consistent with Lamer CJ.'s implicit assumptions in Berg, supra note 40,
and comes close to admitting that Canadian courts are engaged in human rights cases, as in Charter
cases, to undertaking a "private-public distinction analysis."
59 Supra note 5.
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Forest J. seems to suggest that the existence of human rights legislation
fills the Charter gap, and thus mitigates the impact of his ruling in this
case:
The exclusion of private activity from the Charter was ... a deliberate choice which must
be respected. ... Government is the body that can enact and enforce rules and
authoritatively impinge on individual freedom. Only Government requires to be
constitutionally shackled to preserve the rights of the individual. Others, it is true, may
offend against the rights of the individual. This is especially true in a world in which
economic activity is largely left to the private sector [and] where powerful private
institutions are not directly affected by democratic forces. But Government can either
regulate these or create distinct bodies for the protection of human rights and the
advancement of human dignity.60
Whether the human rights codes do fill the Charter gap and
advance a more social democratic conception of human rights is
therefore an open question. The fact that overcoming the threshold
issue might not be sufficient by itself to act as a check on private power is
evident in some obiter comments made by La Forest J. in McKinney.
Speculating on the result of the section 15 equality claim given the
hypothetical premise that the Charter did apply to the university, La
Forest J. held that what was an ex facie breach of the section 15
guarantee of equality was saved as a reasonable limit under section 1.61
It is accordingly necessary to examine the substantive treatment of
equality rights in this context even if the formal issue of application is
overcome.
The opportunity to do precisely that has been afforded by the
Supreme Court's decision in Dickason v. University of Alberta.62 At issue
was whether the university's policy of mandatory retirement at age sixty-
five for tenured faculty offended the Individual's Rights Protection Act.63
The relevant provisions were section 7(1)(b), which provided that "[n]o
employer or any person acting on behalf of an employer shall
discriminate against any person with regard to ... any term of
employment because of the ... age ... of that person," and section 11.1,
which allowed an otherwise discriminatory act to be saved by stating
that:
,A contravention of this Act shall be deemed not to have occurred if the person who is
alleged to have contravened the Act shows that the alleged contravention was reasonable
and justifiable in the circumstances.
60 bid. at 262.
61 bd. at 276-79.
62 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 1103 [hereinafter Dickason].
63 R.S.A. 1980, c. 1-2 [hereinafter mmPA].
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In terms of the Charter, of course, the university was a private
actor and the only available anti-discrimination challenge to its policy
was under IRPA. However, unlike Mcl'nney, the legislation being
impugned contained no limitation on the definition of age as ending at
age sixty-five,64 and because the policy was quickly found to be in breach
of section 7(1)(b), the sole question was whether the retirement policy
could be justified under section 11.1 of iRIA.
Cory J., for the majority, made explicit reference to the fact that
the university was a "private" body. First, he was keen to make the point
that although the Court had disposed of a similar case in McKinney, that
case's result did not automatically transfer to the present instance.65
Cory J. stated that there were important distinctions between the Charter
and human rights legislation:
[I]t must be remembered that there is a crucial difference between human rights
legislation and constitutional rights. Human rights legislation is aimed at regulating the
actions of private individuals. The Charter's goal is to regulate and, on occasion, to
constrain actions of the state.6 6
Accordingly, the obiter remarks of La Forest J. in McKinney
should be seen clearly in the context of government policies and not
elevated above their worth: whether "a mandatory retirement policy in a
private employment setting" could be justified under section 11.1 of iRP,
remained unanswered.6 7 As far as justifying such a policy was
concerned, Cory J. was anxious to underline La Forest J.'s warning in
McKinney that private power could be an equal, if not a more potent,
threat to human rights than governmental action. Commenting on the
deference shown by La Forest J. in Mcl'nney to a putative government
retirement policy, Cory J. was of the view that a similar attitude would
be entirely inappropriate in this case:
To adopt a deferential attitude to ... private aims [of increasing the profit or efficiency of
a business] would undermine the professed goal of human rights legislation to guarantee
the rights of minority groups, women and individuals against arbitrary and abusive
treatment. Legislation aimed at abolishing or reducing discrimination should be given a
64 The Alberta legislation, somewhat ironically in view of the Supreme Court's later decision
in McInney, supra note 5, had been amended to remove a previous limitation of the definition of
age in the same terms as that in Ontario and British Columbia legislation with the express purpose
of complying with the equality sections of the Charter coming into force that year: see S.A. 1985, c.
33.
65Dkkason,supra note 62 at 1127-28.
66 ibid. at 1122.
6 7 1bid. at 1128.
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liberal and generous reading. It follows that any legislated defence to acts of
discrimination should be construed narrowly.68
This meant that although there was a superficial resemblance
between section 1 of the Charter and section 11.1 of irA, and that it was
agreed interpartes that the Oakes69 test employed in Charter cases would
be useful guidance here, this must be applied "without any trace of
deference to a private defendant." 70 Thus, there is a higher standard ofjustification imposed on a private employer in this kind of case
compared to government, one which could only be discharged by
objective proof that the discriminatory policy constituted only a minimal
impairment of the right impugned.71
Applying section 11.1 to Dickason, Cory J. stated that the
university had to demonstrate that its discriminatory practice furthered a
substantial objective and was proportionate to that objective, and that
given the private nature of the defendant, no deference would be given
to its policy choices in this regard. 72 He then considered the significance
of the collective agreement implementing the policy. While
acknowledging that parties should not generally be able to contract out
of human rights obligations, he did consider that collective agreements
could themselves be probative of the reasonableness of an ostensibly
discriminatory practice. According to Cory J., age differs from other
more suspect categories of discrimination in that it will affect everyone.
He was thus satisfied that this particular collective agreement was not an
abuse of the employer's power, and could be relied on to attest to the
reasonableness of the policy. Having so found, it was not surprising that
he agreed that flexibility in resource allocation and faculty renewal were
substantial objectives, and that the policy of mandatory retirement was
proportional to that objective.7 3 In other words, the classical liberal
result and reasoning of McKinney could be transferred after all, with the
result that human rights were not used in defence of (even a formal
conception of) equality. Direct comparison of the treatments of
mandatory retirement under both the Charter and human rights
68 ibid. at 1123.
691R v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 135-42.
70 Dickason, supra note 62 at 1124.
71 Ibid. at 1128-29.
72 ibid. at 1129.
73 Ibid. at 1133-38.
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legislation further diminishes the prospect that the latter might fill the
gap left by the former.
C. Housing and the Rights of the Poor
The rights of poor people to an adequate standard of housing
provide a relevant setting in which to test human rights legislation's
ability to confront inequalities in social power. Whether poor people
seeking accommodation are being discriminated against on the grounds
of their inability to pay a rent in excess of their income is variously
addressed in the codes: the Ontario and Quebec Codes prohibit
discrimination on the grounds of one being in receipt of public
assistance, and one's social condition respectively,74 and in Quebec this
is bolstered by the social right to "an acceptable standard of living."
75
This is another situation where the mere fact of applicability (important
because it is in a predominantly private rental market) will be
insufficient in itself to further social democratic ends. The substantive
problem of lack of adequate shelter faced by the homeless (whatever the
causes may be) is ultimately enforced through the sanctioning by the
state of the institution of private property (which, can of course, be in
public or private ownership), and the state's threat to repel any
challenge to the rights created thereunder. Any attempt to redress the
situation of the homeless accepts that intervention is necessary with
respect to the operation of the rental market,76 and the key question
becomes not whether formal rights are available against landlords in
both public and private sectors, but rather if it is possible to rely on
human rights legislation to enter into the relationship of landlord and
tenant.
In their 1993 joint submission to the United Nations Committee
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the National Anti-Poverty
Organization and the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues highlighted
two distinct advantages that human rights codes appear to possess
74 Ontario Code, supra note 2, s. 2; and Quebec Code, supra note 2, s. 10.
75 Quebec Code, supra note 2, s. 45.
76 That is not, of course, to suggest that the private housing market is entirely unregulated, but
that those tenant protections which do exist, eg., landlord and tenant legislation, generally apply
once one is able to enter into the relationship demanded by the law. Of course, landlords' formal
freedom to contract with whomever they please has been limited in very important ways by human
rights legislation, but the question that remains is whether there is any substantive circumscription
of their right to discriminate on the basis of ability to pay.
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here.77 First, their commitment to enforcing social and economic rights
requires positive intervention to serve the goal of social justice, rather
than a negative emphasis on non-interference with various individual
claims. This (as in Quebec) may take the form of the specific
enumeration of social and economic rights, but is also inherent in the
ideal of equality underpinning the anti-discrimination provisions.7 8
Second, a broader vision of social and economic rights has been given
teeth in various tribunal (or board) and court decisions which have
required remedial action on the part of (often private) employers to
offset the impact of historical discriminatory practices with regard to
various groups.7 9  Given this background, NAPO suggests that
"[r]emedying economic disadvantage is well within the purview of
human rights remedies."8 0
There are two preliminary points to make. First, despite human
rights codes' undeniable potential to alleviate poverty, there has been
very little activity in this area. NAPO notes that, in Ontario, the
prohibition of discrimination with respect to recipients of social
assistance has rarely been invoked by poor people to force positive
action.81 This may in itself give some general indication of the relative
importance of human rights measures; it also attests to problems of
information and accessibility concerning the underprivileged8 2 Second,
the manner in which complaints are raised is revealing. There are two
principal avenues open to a complainant trying to overcome the
imbalance in social power: ask the court to order the state (the
government) to elevate the complainant to a level that would be on
equal terms with the landlord; or, try to bring the landlord down to the
level at which the complainant is able to enter into the landlord-tenant
77 Charter Committee on Poverty Issues and the National Anti-Poverty Organization, The
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living in a Land of Plenty: Submissions to the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Ottawa: NAPO, 1993) at 80-86 [hereinafter NAo].
78 NAPO, ibid at 81, cites by way of example the Ontario Code, supra note 2, s. 11, which
requires positive measures to correct the consequences of "a requirement, qualification or factor ...
that is not discrimination on a prohibited ground but that results in the exclusion, restriction or
preference of a group of persons who are identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination."
79 NApo,supra note 77 at 82, cites in support, inter alia, Ontario (Human Rights Commission)
and O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 [hereinafter O'Malley]; and Canadian
National Railway Co. v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [19871 1 SCR 1114 [hereinafter Action
Travail].
80 1bid.
81 1bid.
82 See Black Report, supra note 34 at 16, regarding the perception of human rights tribunals
as being another unhelpful arm of government.
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relationship. The former approach is invariably preferred, and it is
important to note the form in which the issue is addressed. Given the
common law's creation and maintenance of the laws of property, it
should not be surprising that complaints are not brought directly against
landlords because it is difficult to imagine a tribunal or court
undermining the institution of private property (even if it had the power
to do so) to the extent of ordering a rent to be halved. And yet it is
crucial to ask why this strategy is adopted, because this might suggest
that there are limitations of form which may be imposed on the
enforcement of rights in this context.
When one turns to actual cases, the record is not encouraging.
The Quebec Code gives (textually) the strongest protections, particularly
its inclusion of specific social and economic rights. This part of the Code
is not routinely enforced in the first instance through the Commission
des Droits de la Personne; instead actions can be raised directly in the
courts, although the courts have been reluctant to apply anything more
than a programmatic interpretation to these provisions. In Gosselin v.
Quebec (Procureur General)8 3 a social assistance recipient complained in
an action against the province that her $170 monthly allowance was
inadequate to cover her rent, and that this infringed section 45 of the
Quebec Code guarantee of the right to "financial assistance ...
susceptible of ensuring such person an acceptable standard or living."
8 4
The court held that this guarantee was merely a "policy statement" and
that it could not therefore impugn the Social Aid Act.85 The inability of
the Charter to impose a duty on the Quebec Government (here to
elevate Ms Gosselin to the level where she could pay an adequate rent)
perhaps underscores the difficulties inherent in bringing an action
directly against the landlord: if the Charter does not bind the
government, it seems unlikely that it would impose a greater obligation
on private actors. Where the poor have been able to use human rights
provisions, the tendency has been to extract financial damages from
landlords found guilty of discriminatory conduct such as refusing to rent
to someone on the grounds of their social status.
86
83 (1988), 23 Q.A.C. 329 (C.A.), aff'd [1992] RJ.Q. 1647 (Sup. Ct.).
84 Quebec Code, supra note 2.
85 R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-16.
86 See Quebec (Commission des Droits de la Personne) v. Whittom (1993), 20 C.H.R.R. D/349
(T.D.P.Q.), where an award of $1,000 was made against landlords who had refused to rent
accommodation to the complainant on the grounds of her social condition and civil status, contrary
to the Quebec Code, supra note 2, s. 10; see also D'Aoust v. Vallieres (1993), 19 C.H.R.R. D/322
(T.D.P.Q.), where an award of $500 was granted against the landlords in similar circumstances.
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The potentialities and limitations of the anti-discrimination
provisions in human rights codes to assist poor people in gaining
adequate housing are revealed in the ongoing case of Wiebe v. Ontario.87
This complaint was lodged with the Ontario Human Rights Commission
by Elizabeth Wiebe, who lived with her husband and five children aged
nine to thirteen in Leamington, Ontario. Their annual income at the
time was $17,47888 and they could not afford a rent of more then $500
per month, but were unable to find any accommodation at that price
suitable for a family of seven. Living variously in a garage and a
Salvation Army hostel, Mr. and Mrs. Wiebe had to consent to their four
youngest children becoming wards of the Children's Aid Society. Mrs.
Wiebe subsequently launched a complaint against the Ontario
Government on the basis that the inadequacy of the income assistance
provided to her family resulted in their exclusion from adequate housing
in the private market. She claimed that this infringed the "constructive
discrimination" provision of the Ontario Code, since it resulted in the
"exclusion, restriction or preference of a group of persons identified by a
prohibited ground of discrimination,"8 9 namely public assistance
recipients and persons in a parent and child relationship.
The creeping progress of the case underlines the difficulties a
complainant may encounter. Although the complaint was filed in 1989,
at the time of writing the process had only reached the stage of the
complainant making submissions in response to the Ontario
Commission's case analysis with a view to having the case referred to a,
board of inquiry.90 In the complainant's opinion, this delay has resulted
in the failure to test one of the most serious systemic human rights issues
facing society, namely the increased vulnerability of families on social
87 Ontario Human Rights Commission Complaint No. 20-106S (30 June 1989) [pending]
[hereinafter Wiebe].
88 This figure was $20,672 short of the poverty level of $38,105 set in 1989 through the office
of Sen. D.A Croll. The figure was provided to the author as an update to Canada, Senate Special
Committee on Poverty, Poverty in Canada: Report of the Special Senate Committee on Poverty
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971) (Chair: D.A. Croll) at 8.
89 Ontario Code, supra note 2, s. 11(1).
90 he major respondent, the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, had argued
that social assistance is a special programme in terms of the Ontario Code, ibid. s. 14, that benefit
levels were raised in 1990, and that the Ontario Human Rights Commission initially considered that
the case was beyond its jurisdiction. The case was eventually investigated by the Commission, but
Mrs. Wiebe has complained that the probe was flawed in many aspects, including the investigation
of matters not raised in the complaint and omitting to investigate some important elements, such as
the Ministry's defence outlined above. See Wiebe, supra note 87: "Complainant's Submissions in
Response to the Case Analysis" (14 July 1995) [unpublished].
[VOL 33 NO. 4
Filling the Charter Gap
assistance to discriminatory social policy, and this itself has led to
adverse comments in the United Nations' Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights 1993 Report.91
As well as these possible procedural shortcomings, Wiebe also
reveals more serious limitations in human rights legislation's capacity to
redress imbalances in social power. It is important to remember the
limitations of form in which poverty issues can be addressed. As Martha
Jackman observes, although the receipt of social assistance is a
prohibited ground of discrimination in Ontario, such is not the case in
every province.92 Similarly, had the Wiebes been subsisting on a low
wage income rather than social assistance, it would have been more
difficult to invoke the Ontario Code.93 It is also significant to consider
the best case scenario in the Wiebe complaint. Assuming the complaint
is upheld, like the Quebec cases noted above, the remedy sought is
damages for the complainant and her family, and while this could make
a large difference to the Wiebes' ability to find adequate
accommodation, it is still a decision a quo, whose precedential value in
the present case could be diminished to the extent that the complaint
also relies on family status. However, a more systemic remedy is
requested in addition, which would give the board of inquiry jurisdiction
for three years from this decision to review any changes to social
assistance rates for evidence of their impact on homelessness among
families. How easily this could be enforced remains to be seen, but it is
important to recognize that the attack on systemic inequality mounted in
Wiebe is not aimed at undermining the substantive protection of private
power-which will still be in place following the Wiebe decision-but
rather at mitigating its worst effects. That is not to say that cases like
Wiebe should not be raised: anti-poverty campaigners in the present
political climate in Ontario have little other means of challenge, and a
positive decision in Wiebe might lead to a change in attitudes and
practices. However, given the resistance and delay that Mrs. Wiebe has
met, it seems difficult to argue that the inequalities highlighted by La
91 See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Report of the Committee on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 1993 (Geneva: United Nations, Economic and Social Council,
1993) U.N. Doc. E/C.1211993/5 (1993).
92 M. Jackman, "Constitutional Contact with the Disparities in the World: Poverty as a
Prohibited Ground of Discrimination Under the Canadian Charter and Human Rights Law" (1995)
2 Rev. Coast. Stud. 76 at 115-16.
93 Ibid. at 116.
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Forest J.94 and Hogg95 at the outset are being adequately addressed by
existing human rights legislation.
D. Systemic Discrimination, Employment, and Pay Equity
The problem of systemic discrimination provides another
apposite environment in which to assess human rights legislation's ability
to confront abuses of private power. The term systemic discrimination is
used here to denote the phenomenon whereby historical discriminatory
practices and attitudes have resulted in de facto disadvantage being
visited upon certain groups; for example, where past and continuing
identification of certain lower-skilled and lower-paid jobs as being
women's jobs has resulted in the present wage gap between women and
menY6 Although these past practices and attitudes may well have been
quite intentional, systemic discrimination stands in contrast to direct
discrimination whereby the victim of discrimination suffers from a
(relatively contemporaneous) specific intentional act on the part of, for
example, an employer.97 While a detailed assessment of the meaning,
causes, and rectification of systemic discrimination is beyond the scope
of this paper,9 8 legislatures and courts have recognized systemic
discrimination as a problem to be addressed in the human rights context.
Several codes provide for the operation of special programmes designed
to eliminate or reduce past disadvantages,99 and in some jurisdictions
this principle has been extended to include employment and pay equity
94 Supra note 13.
95 Constitutional Law, supra note 15.
96 See J.A. Fudge & P.C. McDermott, "Introduction: Putting Feminism to Work" in J.A.
Fudge & P.C. McDermott, Just Wages: A FeministAssessment of Pay Equity (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1991) 1 at 4 [hereinafter Just Wages].
97 It can also be contrasted with indirect discrimination, which refers to a narrower concept of
non-intentional discrimination whereby an employment requirement or condition has an adverse
affect on an employee by reason of a prohibited ground of discrimination: see, for example, Bhinder
v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561 [hereinafter Bhinder]. To the extent that
systemic discrimination attributes larger societal explanations to continuing discrimination, it can be
seen as a broader conception of indirect discrimination.
98 The question of what constitutes systemic discrimination, its causes, and the most effective
way to eradicate it have been the subject of extended and intense scholarly debate which it is beyond
the scope of this paper to rehearse in any detail. For a representative sample of the literature on
the subject, see Just Wages, supra note 96; and Knopff, supra note 27, c. 6.
99 See, for example, CHRA, supra note 2, s. 16; Ontario Code, supra note 2, s. 14; and Quebec
Code, supra note 2, ss. 86-92.
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schemes (either by amendment to the code1 ° ° or the enactment of
specific legislationl0 ). The courts have accepted that this form of
legislation will require positive measures to achieve its goals.102 How
this is put into effect raises important questions about how far human
rights legislation can succeed in redressing inequalities in social and
economic power.
Systemic discrimination arises in the context of the public/private
divide in at least two ways. First, to the extent that it is a societal
problem, and that the private sector is (increasingly) a significant
component of society, systemic discrimination occurs in the private
sector. That much is obvious, but figures show that in some settings the
symptoms of systemic discrimination are heightened when one is dealing
with the private sector.103 Second, any legislative attempt to deal with
systemic discrimination is itself recognition that abuse of private power
contributes to continuing inequality. Any intervention to correct this
accepts that, for example, women's subordinate position in terms of the
wage gap is not the result of "neutral market forces," but "the result of a
cumulative history of discrimination and bias"104 and that non-
interference in these aspects of political and economic life attributes to
men and women formal equality devoid of that historical discrimination,
and thus perpetuates its effects. Legislation that confronts systemic
discrimination must therefore attack many of the traditional privileges
enjoyed by private power to be effective.
The courts have agreed that positive remedial measures will be
necessary to achieve the social democratic aims of this legislation. In the
context of employment equityAction Travaill05 reveals the strengths and
weaknesses of the judicial process in dealing with systemic
discrimination. A complaint was raised by the Action Travail des
Femmes Syndicat alleging that Canadian National (cN) was guilty of
discriminatory hiring practices under section 10 of CHRA in respect of
hiring women for specific blue collar jobs. A tribunal had ordered cN to
desist from the discriminatory practices, and required that the railway
100 See, for example, cHA, supra note 2, ss. 7 and 11.
101 See, for example, Pay Equity Act, S.O. 1993, c. 4, as am. by Savings and Restructuring Act,
1996, S.O. 1996, c. 1, Schedule J [hereinafter Pay EquiftyAct].
102 See Action Travail, supra note 79. In the context of indirect discrimination, see Bhinder,
supra, note 97; and O'Malley, supra note 79.
103 See Just Wages, supra note 96 at 8.
104 1bid. at 4.
105 Supra note 79.
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work toward the goal that at least 13 per cent of workers in these jobs(being the average percentage for these positions in the Canadian
workforce) should be women. It also ordered CN to hire one woman in
four for each new position until that goal was attained. The decision was
appealed on the grounds that it was outside the jurisdiction of the
tribunal, and in particular questioned whether section 41(2)(a) of CHRA,
which provides for a tribunal to order a respondent to "take measures ...
to prevent the same or a similar [discriminatory] practice occurring in
the future," could be used to address historic discrimination. The order
was unanimously upheld by the Supreme Court, with Dickson C.J.
stating it was an "uncontradicted fact that the hiring and promotion
policies of CN ... amounted to a systematic denial of women's equal
employment opportunities."106 His judgment was rendered in terms that
appear to allow for considerable intervention to remedy historical
discrimination:
To render future discrimination pointless, to destroy discriminatory stereotyping and to
create the required "critical mass" of target group participation in the work force, it is
essential to combat the effects of past systemic discrimination. In so doing, possibilities
are dreated for the continuing amelioration of employment opportunities for the
previously excluded group. The dominant purpose of employment equity programmes is
always to improve the situation of the target group in the future. Systemic remedies must
be built upon the experience of the past so as to prevent discrimination in the future.
Specific hiring goals ... are a rational attempt to impose a systemic remedy on a systemic
problem.1 07
To what extent is this doctrine translated into practice through
human rights legislation? Passing on why 13 per cent was readily
accepted as an adequate percentage of women in blue-collar jobs, it is
crucial to note that eight years after this case, the percentage of women
in blue-collar jobs at CN had still not reached that mark. That is not to
suggest that CN deliberately obfuscated the process: the railway complied
with the one in four hiring requirement and dutifully submitted reports
on their progress to the Canadian Human Rights Commission as
ordered. However, at a time of recession and retrenchment, the trend
has been to downsize the workforce, and reaching the goal would
require the dismissal of male employees for that reason alone. Thus, an
attempt to eradicate systemic discrimination by means of a proactive
employment equity scheme, even one applied and operated in good
faith, can be seen as having limited effectiveness. Action Travail shows
that employment equity schemes operate subject to broader forces, for
106Ibi, at 1141.
107 1buid at 1145.
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example, how the market is affecting employment opportunities and the
economic performance of the corporation, which may be beyond their
scope and ability to change: perhaps their importance in transcending
systemic discrimination should not be exaggerated.
As stated above, the wage gap between men and women has
been identified as one of the enduring manifestations of systemic
discrimination. The legislative response to this problem in a number of
jurisdictions has been to extend the anti-discrimination principle of the
human rights codes by the enactment of specific pay equity laws.108
Among these, Ontario's Pay Equity Act 1 9 deserves special mention, not
only because of its political saliency in light of the election of the
Conservative government, but also because it was considered to be
potentially the most far-reaching statute of its kind.110 This is principally
because it was the first instrument of its type to apply in both public and
private employment sectors which, given the fact that that the wage gap
is wider in the private sector, is viewed as an important concession. 111
As such, it signalled a political willingness to interfere with aspects of the
employer/employee relationship traditionally regarded as private and
thus unregulated, and therefore provided a benchmark for measuring
the efficacy of human rights-based legislation to displace historical
imbalances in social power resulting from systemic discrimination.
Although it goes further than similar legislation in Canada and
elsewhere, Ontario's Pay Equity Act has nonetheless been subjected to
extensive criticism that focuses on flaws in its structure. If the object of
pay equity is to break the cycle of identifying certain menial and low-
paid jobs with women, then it is imperative that comparisons are made
between predominately male and female sectors of the workforce, which
will often involve assessing the comparative worth of very different
occupations. However, the Ontario statute is structured so that
comparisons are made only within a particular employer's workforce,
and many women in traditional female jobs are outside the ambit of the
108 See, for examplePayEquityAct, S.M. 1985, c. 21; andAct to Provide for Pay Equity, S.N.S.
1988, c. 16.
109 Supra note 101.
110 See J.A. Fudge, "Limiting Equity: The Definition of 'Employer' under the Ontario Pay
Equity Act" (1990-91) 4 CJ.W.L. 556 at 557 [hereinafter "Limiting Equity"]. For an extended
discussion of the background of and the specific measures contained in the Ontario Pay Equity Act,
supra note 101, see C.J. Cuneo, "The State of Pay Equity: Mediating Gender and Class through
Political Parties in Ontario" in Just Wages, supra note 96 at 33.
111 See Just Wages, supra note 96 at 8.
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Act.1 12 It has been suggested that, as a result, almost 50 per cent of
female workers are unable to claim pay adjustments precisely because
they work in "female jobs" (e.g., child care centres and garment
factories) which lack appropriate male comparators.113 This inevitably
means that the main beneficiaries are not those women working in low-
paid "women's" jobs, but those who have been accepted into the male
sector of the market and who are thus relatively well-off.1 14 It has also
been observed that the proactive element of the Act requiring the filing
of equity plans applies only to employers with at least 100 employees,
and that workers in smaller firms have to rely on the reactive process of
lodging a complaint.115 In smaller firms, however, particularly in rural
communities, there may be considerable pressure (despite statutory
protections against retaliation) not to be seen as the whistle-blower. 116
Although these criticisms are directed toward the legislative drafting, it
is important to remember that technical decisibns have political
consequences, 117 and arguably in this context this has meant that despite
the acceptance of the systemic causes of the wage gap, there has been a
"shift of focus from the gender based wage gap to a process whereby
each individual group seeks its own equity. '118 In other words, there has
been a shift of focus toward non-systemic remedies. As with the case of
poverty, the role of human rights and related legislation vis-t-vis
systemic discrimination has been one of alleviating certain symptoms of
the phenomenon, but not of dealing with the underlying causes.119
112 See "Limiting Equity," supra note 110 at 558.
113 S. Findlay, "Making Sense of Pay Equity: Issues for a Feminist Political Practice" in Just
Wages, supra note 96 at 81.
114 P. Armstrong & H. Armstrong, "Limited Possibilities and Possible Limits for Pay Equity:
Within and Beyond the Ontario Legislation" in Just Wages, supra note 96 at 110.
115 Limiting Equity, supra note 110 at 558, n. 4.
116 See Black Report, supra note 34 at 15.
117 See P.C. McDermott, "Pay Equity Challenge to Collective Bargaining in Ontario" in Just
Wages, supra note 96 at 122.
118 P.C. McDermott, "Pay Equity in Ontario: A Critical Legal Analysis" (1990) 28 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 381 at 407.
119 Ontario's Pay Equity Act, supra note 101 was substantially amended by the Savings and
Restructuring Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 1, Schedule J. Among other changes, the "proxy method of
comparison" has been repealed, while other provisions of the 1993 Act have been watered down.
However, to the extent that it was the most far reaching Canadian measure yet adopted, the
comments that are offered herein suggest that is indicative of a general approach to systemic
discrimination found in other relevant legislation, and so are relevant in terms of any future attempt
to enact legislation of this type.
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IV. COMPARING THE CHARTER AND HUMAN RIGHTS
CODES: MORE SIMILARITIES THAN DIFFERENCES?
The four case studies outlined in Part III, above, appear to
suggest that despite the potential of human rights codes to realize a
more social democratic vision of society, they do not in fact fill the
Charter gap, in the sense that they fail to redress imbalances in social and
economic power in the private sector. How, therefore, does one explain
their inability to utilize their ostensible advantages? The answer seems
to be that the more closely one examines the Charter and human rights
regimes, the more they appear to have in common. In particular, they
are both individual complaints-based systems enforcing liberal rights,
and this builds into both systems a number of features that militate
against implementing social democracy. These features arise in two key
areas. First, the institutional structure of the enforcement mechanisms
of the human rights codes prevents an effective challenge to established
patterns of inequality. Second, the doctrinal framework within which
both regimes operate is committed to removing certain private issues
from regulation in the name of equality, revealing an adherence to a
substantive conception of the public/private divide under human rights
legislation. This framework provides stronger protection for private
power than the formal question of applicability. The final section will
analyze how an understanding of both of these aspects helps to explain
the ascendancy of classical liberal values over social democratic ones in
both Charter and human rights cases.
A. Similarities of Institutional Design: The Limits of Individuated Justice
At an institutional level, both the Charter and human rights
codes are essentially systems based on individual complaints, existing for
the redress of alleged discrimination. This builds limitations into each
system in terms of their ability to reach the structural causes of
inequality. Many of the issues canvassed above, such as the rights of the
poor to adequate housing, and overcoming the wage gap between men
and women, are singularly incapable of being solved by focusing on
specific instances of discrimination. Black summarizes these limits in his
report on human rights in British Columbia:
No single complaint ... could cover all aspects of a problem that involves the interaction
of different parts of government plus organizations in the private sector.... Even where a
single organization is responsible for the inequality, a complaints-based system will often
be inadequate by itself.... A complaints-based system is least effective in dealing with the
1995]
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subtle effects of seemingly neutral policies and practices. Often, no one has the
information needed to file a complaint about such practices.1 2 0
This adverts to a second problem which is that the individual
complaints structure itself contributes to the idea that individual acts are
the exception to an otherwise non-discriminatory private housing market
or private employment sector. The difficulty here is a system that
focuses on those individual complaints that happen to reach the hearing
stage, and so only addresses some more visible or high profile aspects of
discrimination and therefore leaves in place other discriminatory
practices which may be equally, if not more, invidious.
Linked to this shared emphasis with the Charter on individual
complaints is the fact that threshold-type issues do surface in human
rights legislation which restrict the number of cases that can be heard.
That issue is the filtering role of the various human rights commissions
in deciding how far complaints should proceed 21 In every system
(except Quebec's), this is the only means by which a complaint can be
brought to a hearing,'2 2 and the codes often provide only vague criteria
to commissions on how to exercise this discretion, such as "having regard
to all the circumstances of the complaint, [whether] an inquiry into the
complaint is warranted."123 Two major recent reports on the workings
of the human rights bodies in British Columbia12 4 and Ontario,125 have
revealed considerable disquiet among those active in this area.
Ontario's Cornish Report disclosed that complainants were in many
120 Black Report, supra note 34 at 15 and 17.
1 2 1 The general rule is that complaints are brought, in the first instance, to the attention of the
commission, which decides whether the complaint is one which falls within its competence. If the
claim is competent, the commission conducts an investigation, and attempts to mediate between the
parties to reach a settlement. If unsuccessful, the commission has the discretion to refer the matter
for a hearing to a board or tribunal for its ultimate disposition.
122 In Quebec, individuals can raise actions through the ordinary courts with respect to all
aspects of the Quebec Code, supra note 2, including fundamental freedoms, social rights, and anti-
discrimination provisions. Complaints may be referred to the commission only with respect to the
final category, and even if the Quebec Commission declines to proceed, it will still be open to the
complainant to initiate court proceedings.
123 caRn, supra note 2, s. 49(1).
124 See Black Report, supra note 34.
125 See Ontario Human Rights Code Review Task Force, Achieving Equality: A Report on
Human Rights Reform (Toronto: Ontario Policy Services Branch, Ministry of Citizenship, 1992)
(Chair: M. Cornish) [hereinafter Cornish Report]. For a consideration of how the Quebec
Commission has used its more limited power, see L. LaMarche & F. Poiier, Le Rigime Qudb~cois
de Protection et de Promotion des Droits de la Personne: Elements de Reflexion pour un Bilan
(Cowansville, Quebec: Yvon Blais, 1996).
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cases unhappy with the treatment they received from that province's
Human Rights Commission during the investigation of complaints, and
the report concluded that too few cases were in fact proceeding to
hearings by a board of inquiry.126 The Webe127 case highlights the very
real difficulties that complainants may encounter in advancing their
claims under this procedure, and shows that the threshold issue in
human rights legislation may be as serious an obstacle as section 32 in
Charter cases.
Discussion of the filtering role of the human rights commission
underscores a third limitation of institutional design in terms of
confronting private power. Human rights commissions operate within a
political environment, and there may be pressures that affect how they
execute their functions, as can be observed in the recent history of the
Ontario Human Rights Commission. The pattern of cases referred to
Boards of Inquiry in the 1990s is one of a considerable increase in
numbers from 1990 to 1992, followed by a period of retrenchment. This
can be seen as reflecting the initial enthusiasm of the Ontario New
Democratic Party (1,rml) government for proactive use of human rights
machinery, and the appointment of commissioners who would
implement that agenda, followed by a commitment to fiscal restraint and
strict adherence to budgetary management in the public sector. These
policy trends are indicated by the commissioning of the Cornish Report
to "make recommendations for a fair and practical system for the
enforcement of human rights in Ontario." 128 But the report was given a
lukewarm reception in the province's Standing Committee on the
Administration of Justice. The principal recommendations of the
Cornish Report were never implemented during the NDI government's
term of office. The elimination of its considerable backlog is currently
one of the main priorities of the Ontario Commission (which the
126 See Cornish Report, supra note 125 at 17-18. In his report on human rights in British
Columbia, Black observes that within the existing structure there may be reasons why a serious
human rights abuse may not lead to a hearing or remedial action. The focus of the codes on
individual complaints can mean that there may be no incentive for the commission to proceed with
a complaint if its investigation reveals grounds for dismissal, (e.g., that the complainant was
justifiably rejected for a job), and there may never be an investigation into the underlying fairness of
the selection process. Similarly, the pressure to settle a case may cut short the lifespan of an
erstwhile investigation, and may leave more systemic causes of discrimination undisturbed. See
Black Report, supra note 34 at 16.
12 7 Supra note 87.
128 Cornish Report, supra note 125 at i.
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Commission itself acknowledges in a recent Annual Report),1 29 and
some human rights activists worry that this leads to an emphasis on
dismissing complaints if at all possible rather than the prioritization of
investigating more serious abuses. The concern is that the needs of the
administration are driving the Ontario Commission's approach to
human rights complaints, rather than vice versa.
Bearing in mind these three factors of institutional design-the
inability to address structural causes of inequality on a systematic basis,
the use of the filtering process to restrict access to hearings, and the
pressures of the relationship between those administering the human
rights codes and their political overseers-the similarities to the Charter
become more obvious. Accordingly, it should now be less surprising that
human rights legislation is unable to mount a more potent threat to the
established interests of private power. However, institutional design can
always be reformed; the shared characteristic that is perhaps more
deadly to the aspirations of social democracy is the doctrinal harmony
between both systems in terms of their adherence to preserving a
public/private divide. How this adherence serves to protect private
power from political interference under human rights legislation will
now be explored.
B. The Formal and Substantive Aspects of the Public/Private Divide
The difficulty that presents itself in the context of Charter and
human rights cases is how to explain the similarity of outcome despite
first, the acknowledgement of the oppressive potential of private power
in the latter regime, and second, its consequent application to the private
sector. A clue to the answer comes from obiter comments in Charter
cases such as Dolphin Delivery3 ° and McKinney 31 which show that even
if the threshold issue of applicability is crossed, there is no guarantee
that human rights can be successfully prosecuted against abuses of
private power. This suggests that there may be a number of ways in
which the public/private divide can be created, and that perhaps the
issue of applicability is in many ways a red herring.
The most helpful way to analyze the operation of human rights
legislation in the private sector appears to distinguish between the
129 See Ontario Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 1991-92 (Toronto: The
Commission, 1992) at 17-20.
130 Supra note 4.
131 Supra note 5.
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formal and substantive elements of the public/private divide. The
former relates to threshold questions, such as the class of persons to
which the Charter applies, or the filtering roles of the human rights
commissions. The formal aspect is a necessary condition to overcome in
order to challenge private power, and if this is interpreted restrictively,
as with the Supreme Court's section 32 Charter jurisprudence, this will
be sufficient to defeat many such challenges at the initial stage. The
substantive divide arises if the threshold is successfully crossed, and
protects private power not through procedural means, but by structural
devices embedded in legal doctrine, such as private property and privity
of contract 13 2 Hester Lessard argues that a substantive public/private
divide (which is premised on formal values) is implicit in the liberal
concept of discrimination that informs the Charter and that "assumes an
ideal world where discrimination consists of isolated deviations from the
norm rather than dealing with the real world whose starting point is a
widespread historically determined imbalance." 13 3 The same conclusion
could equally be applied to human rights legislation, and once this
insight is appreciated, the overarching similarities between the two
systems fall into place.
Thus, in Dickason,134 equality rights get further across the
threshold than in McKinneyl35 where they perished at the hands of the
formal divide. However, crossing the threshold is not sufficient in itself
to ensure the vindication of equality rights because of the Court's
attachment to the substantive public/private divide (and so proves that
this is in fact a more serious obstacle to overcome). This is the only way
to make sense of the inconsistencies within the Dickason judgment. In
fact, it is difficult to reconcile the abnegation of deference towards
private defendants lest this interfere with the professed goal of human
132 See J.A. Fudge, "The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to the
Use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 485 at 489.
133 H. Lessard, "The Idea of the 'Private' (1986) 10 Dalhousie LJ. 107 at 119. At a more
general level, the substantive divide is reinforced when the interpretation of particular rights retains
the idea that there are some areas that remain "private" and thus unregulated, for example, when
equality rights make distinctions between those forms of discrimination that are outlawed and those
that are not: see Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143; and
Schachtschneider v. Canada, [1994] 1 F.C. 40 (C.A.); or when some forms of association receive
protection and others do not: see Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; and Reference Re
Public Sector Employees Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; or when some agreed-upon
limitations of rights can nonetheless be "demonstrably justified as reasonable in a free and
democratic society": see McKinney, supra note 5.
134 Supra note 62.
135 Supra note 5.
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rights legislation, viz. the protection of minorities with the probative
weight accorded the collective agreement where the minority under
threat in this case, those over age sixty-five, can suffer double jeopardy at
the hands of both their employers and their younger union colleagues.
Similarly, the ranking in terms of objectionableness of various forms of
discrimination, with age coming below race or religion, on the grounds
that, unlike the latter categories, age will affect everyone, seems to
escape the fact that it will not happen to everyone at the same time.
Moreover, those over sixty-five still constitute a minority, and possibly a
more vulnerable minority than those younger and employed, who can
rely on a number of statutory protections against dismissal. These
distinctions make more sense in terms of the operation of a substantive
public/private divide which seeks to protect various private interests
from the regulatory aspirations of public law.
Similarly, in poverty cases, the fact that 6omplaints can be
brought against private landlords is to a large extent irrelevant when
measured against the unwillingness and/or inability of the courts and
tribunals to undermine the institution of private property. In this
context, following a strategy that uses rights to bring the poor up to the
level of the landlord rather than to reduce rents makes sense: to request
a court to enforce the latter strategy is asking it to attack a fundamental
element of private power, an approach which subscription to the
substantive divide tenders almost inconceivable. The various attempts
to use human rights type legislation to deal with systemic discrimination
also affirms the resilience of the substantive divide. As Fudge observes,
despite the operation of the Ontario pay equity legislation with respect
to private employers, many of the substantive elements of discrimination
are left firmly in place:
For the majority of women workers in Ontario, their success in using the pay equity
legislation to increase their wages will depend upon decisions beyond their control: the
sector in which they are employed; whether or not they are unionized; the existence of an
appropriate male comparator; the size of their employer's labour force; and whether or
not they are employed on a casual or a temporary contract basis. And it is precisely these
factors, which strongly correlate with low pay, that are beyond the scope of the Ontario
Pay Equity Act to remedy.136
136 "Limiting Equity," supra note 110 at 557.
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V. CONCLUSION
The experience of the human rights codes in the private sector
indicates that they do not "fill the Charter gap" because they fail to
implement a more social democratic vision of human rights. The
institutional choice of legislative codes instead of the Charter does not
seem to make it easier to use rights discourse in order to advance
egalitarian values and outcomes. The tendency in both Charter and
human rights regimes is to identify rights with either the formal or
substantive aspects of the public/private divide, with the result that in
each case private power is protected from social democratic
intervention. That is not to say that these characteristics are necessarily
inherent in the structure of rights discourse. However, in the absence of
significant mobilization articulating a different political purpose for
human rights-one that has at its centre the goal of remedying the
ongoing and widespread discrimination suffered as a result of
inequalities in private social and economic power-the inability of rights
discourse to deliver social democratic goals is all too evident. This is
unlikely to change so long as there is judicial and academic support for
the view that human rights legislation does "fill the Charter gap." Such a
gap clearly does still exist, and requires more than the formal application
of human rights against private bodies before one can assert with
confidence that the concerns of social democracy are adequately
addressed in Canadian society.
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